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COMMENTS
to survive in a hard climate, does it necessarily follow that the
same standard should apply to jurors? It would seem that there
would be a clear and present danger to the substantive evil of a
disorderly and unfair administration of justice in that jurors
may be biased by what they have heard and read outside of the
court room long before a judge would be, unless the same premise
is to be applied to jurors.
WALTER J. TAYLOR, JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL UNDER EMER-
GENCY PRICE CONTROL ACT. In United States v. Jepson" the gov-
ernment brought an action under the Emergency Price Control
Act of 19422 to recover treble damages for rent overcharges. The
defendant moved for a jury trial, claiming that his right fell
within the guarantee of the Seventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Held, this action for a penalty under statute
conforms to the requisites of the common law action of debt and
trial by jury should be upheld.
In speaking of penalties under a civil statute, Blackstone was
of the opinion that the action of debt arose from the obligations
imposed on each citizen by the original social contract. When
that contract was broken, the legislature prescribed a sum cer-
tain as a penalty which then became due and owing as a debt.3
In the instant case it is the statute that supplies the causa de-
bendi and stipulates that a certain or ascertainable sum is due
and owing to specified persons when the specified acts are done.4
Thus, all the requisites of the action of debt are fulfilled when
the obligation to pay and the certainey of the amount due arise
from the operation of the statute.
The right to trial by jury in a civil case originates in the
Seventh Amendment of the Constitution which states:
In suits at common law where the value of the controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved. 5
1. 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.C.N.J. 1950). The opinion is that of the district
court judge in response to defendant's motion for a jury trial.
2. Presumably under § 205e of 56 STAT. 23, 50 U.S.C. § 205e (1946) as
amended 50 U.S.C.A. § 925e (Supp. 1950).
3. 3 BL. COMM. 161.
4. KEIGWIN, CASES IN COMMON LAW PLEADING, 34 (2d ed. 1934).
5. U.S. CONsT. AMEND. VH.
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Whether the action of debt on a statute is a suit at common law%
and therefore within the guarantees of the Seventh Amendment
depends on what were considered suits at common law when the
Constitution was adopted.8 An early case, Parsons v. Bedford,
defines suits at common law as:
. . . not merely suits which the common law recognized
among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which
legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contra
distinction to those where equitable rights alone were rec-
ognized.7
Perhaps it is because the law is so settled on the point that few
cases have arisen where the issue involved the defendant's right
to a jury trial in a suit based on a penal statute requiring for-
feiture or the payment of money. In the great bulk of the cases
on penal statutes, the primary issue has been: Is this a civil or
a criminal case? Such a question had to be answered, not to de-
cide the right of trial of jury, but to rule on the admission of
evidence. If the action was criminal, the Constitution requires
confrontation by the accusors8 and prohibits self-incrimination.9
The great majority of cases has held statutory actions for
forfeiture or for money to be civil.1- In some of these cases, the
courts have decided collaterally that the right of trial by jury
originates from the Seventh Amendment. Thus, in United States
v. Regan, the court said:
While the defendant was entitled to have the issues tried
before a jury, this right did not arise from Article III of the
Constitution or from the Sixth Amendment for both relate
to prosecutions which are strictly criminal in their nature
... but it did arise out of the fact that in a civil action of
debt involving more than $20, a jury trial is demandable.1
6. U.S. v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936); Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474(1935); Vide Bellevance v. Plastic Craft Novelty Company, 30 F. Supp. 37(D.C. Mass. 1939); Fitzpatric v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of London, 1 F.R.D.
713 (D.C.N.J. 1941); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 102 F.2d 16 (8th
Cir. 1939); Simmons v. U.S., 29 F. Supp. 285 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
7. 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830).
8. U.S. CONST. A~imND. VI.
9. U.S. CONST: AmEND. V.
10. Hepner v. U.S., 213 U.S. 103 (1903); Stearns v. U.S., 22 Fed. Cas.
1188, No. 13,341 (D.C. Vt. 1830); Quantity of Manufactured Tobacco, 20
Fed. Cas. 121, No. 11,499 (S.D.N.Y. 1879); Jacobs v. U.S., 13 Fed. Cas. 267,
No. 7,157 (E.D. Vir. 1821) ; Stockwell v. U.S., 13 Wall. 531, 542, 543 (1871) ;
U.S. v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1895); U.S. v. Mundel, 27 Fed. Cas. 23, No.
15,834 (C.C. Vir. 1795)
11. U.S. v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47 (1913).
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In United States v. Steamship, the Queen,2 however, the right
of trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment was raised
directly when the defendant demanded a jury trial, but only then
because there was some doubt whether the master of the ship
was under admiralty jurisdiction and therefore not entitled to
trial by jury. In this case, the vessel and master were being sued
for penalties under the revenue laws for smuggling. As to the
vessel, it was clear that it was under admiralty jurisdiction and
would be proceeded against by libel. The master of the ship in-
sisted on a jury trial as guaranteed in suits at common law under
the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. It
was held by the court that since the action against the master
was neither in admiralty as defined by statute, nor in equity, it
must be at common law and therefore subject to the guarantees
of the Seventh Amendment.
The substantive right of trial by jury in actions for a penalty
under statute has lost none of its validity under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, even though there is now but one form
of action, the civil action. It was pointed out in Conn. v.Kohle-
man that:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while abolishing any
distinction in procedure between law and equity, did not
abolish the distinction between legal and equitable remedies,
and preserved the right to a jury trial as declared by this
[VII] Amendment.13
Thus, before the enactment of the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942, under which the principal case was decided, there was
a large body of authority which clearly supported the proposi-
tion that debt on a statute was a common law action which car-
ried with it the right of trial by jury under the Seventh Amend-
ment.' Yet, in spite of this authority, the Federal Courts have
so construed the various remedies under the Act in such a way
as to deny the right of trial by jury in a large number of cases.
The pivotal case in which the right to trial by jury has been
12. 27 Fed. Cas. 669, No. 16,107 (S.D.N.Y. 1870)
13. 2 F.R.D. 514, 516 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
14. Though there is a surprising dearth of square holdings on the point,
the proposition is well established by dicta. This lack of direct authority
can best be explained because few defendants were denied trial by jury. It
was only in unusual cases such as the United States v. Steamship, the
Queen, 27 Fed. Cas. 669, No. 16,107 (S.D.N.Y. 1870) which involved the
question of admiralty jurisdiction, that the Constitutional right of trial byjury was an important issue in the case.
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limited is Porter v. Warner Holding Co.'5 In this case the United
States brought a suit under section 205a 16 of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942. This part of the Act authorized an
injunction or other order against the landlord to restrain the
extraction of rents in excess of the ceiling price. The govern-
ment prayed for an injunction against further offenses and for
return of the over-charges by way of restitution. The principal
conflict was whether it was proper to allow recovery of rents
under the injunction section of the statute with no jury trial, in
view of the fact that the Act in another section also provided
that the tenant, or the United States standing in his place, could
recover treble damages for the overcharge.17
The cases on the allowance of damages in equity were in con-
flict and the authoritative writers were in complete disagree-
ment.'8 This left the Supreme Court in the Porter case without
a clear line of authority for the proposition that once a court
sitting in equity has taken jurisdiction it will give all further
15. 328 U.S. 395 (1945).
16. EMERGENCE PRICE CONTROL ACT of 1942, note 1 supra, § 205a pro-
vided that: "Whenever, in the judgment of the Administrator any person
has engaged in or is about to engage in any act or practice which constitute
or will constitute a violation of any provision in section 4 of this Act, he
may make application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such
acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance to such provision, and
upon showing by the Administrator, that such a person has engaged or is
about to engage in such acts or practices, a permanent or temporary injunc-
tion, restraining order, or other order shall be granted without bond."
17. EMERGENCE PRICE CONTROL ACT of 1942, note 1 supra, § 205e provides
that the tenant may bring suit for treble damages within one year of the
overcharge, but If the tenant, does not press suit within the thirty day period
or is otherwise disabled, the Adminisrator, on behalf of the United States,
may bring suit within the one year period following the overcharge. An
action by the Administrator will be a bar to the tenant.
18. It is to be noted that where no statute is involved, the law is unsettled
on this point and there is great conflict among the writers. In CooK, CASES
ON EQUITY 136 n. 8 (3rd Ed. 1940), the author criticised the position stated
in AMES, CASES ON EQUITY JURISDICTION 571 (1st Ed. 1904). This was the
same proposition quoted in Porter v. Warner Holding Company as the con-
trolling reason for allowing money payments to be recovered as an incident
to injunctive relief. It was Cook's opinion that it was impossible to know
whether the plaintiff was appealing to the equity or to the law side of the
court unless one of the parties made a demand for trial by jury. If there
is a distinctly legal right involved, he was further of the opinion that the
defendant's right to a jury trial was a substantive Constitutional right
which should be unheld. The attack on Ames was met in CAFEE, CASES ON
EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST ToRTs 257 (1st Ed. 1924). Chafee saw no reason
why the Constitutional guarantees would be infringed in denying trial byjury since courts of equity were assessing damages at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution.
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relief including money damages. But the majority of the court
attempted to resolve the conflict in the cases and among the
writers by adopting the principle that:
[when] the equitable jurisdiction of the court has properly
been invoked for injunctive purposes, the court has the
power to decide all relevant matters in dispute and to award
complete relief even though the decree includes that which
may be conferred by a court of law.19
The dissenters in the 5 to 3 decision, led by Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge, could not subscribe to the principle adopted by the major-
ity nor could they indorse the traditional reasons for allowing
equity to give money relief once the court has taken jurisdiction,
expecially when this doctrine conflicted with the minutely
planned remedies under the Act. Mr. Justice Rutledge seized on
the admission by the majority that section 205e of the Act"
provided the exclusive remedy in damages. It is important to
note that the statutory period in which the tenant could bring
an action under section 205e had passed. The Administrator,
however, could still sue on that section for the benefit of the
United States. The dissenter went on to point out his objections
to the allowance of damages by way of restitution under the in-
junction section of the act:
But we are asked in effect to decide that he [the Administra-
tor] can take the money the Act says shall go into the Treas-
ury and give it to the person whose right to recover it the
Act has cut off.., even courts of equity may not grant relief
in disregard of the remedies specifically defined by Con-
greSS.21
Subsequent cases22 have followed the reasoning of the major-
ity in the Porter case. They have held that the order for restitu-
tion could be given under the injunction section of the Act and
have rejected the contention that the tenant could not be bene-
fited because his right to sue for treble damages has been cut off.
One court, however, lamented having to follow the Porter case
19. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399 (1945).
20. EMERGENCY PRICE CONTROL ACT of 1942, note 1 supra.
21. Portner v. Warner Holding Company, 328 U.S. 395, 407 (1945).
22. Creedon v. Randolph, 165 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1948); Wood v.
Lajeunesse, 82 F. Supp. 445 (D.S.N.H. 1949); Woods v. Witzke, 174 F.2d
855 (6th Cir. 1949); Cobleigh v. Woods, 172 F.2d 167 (1st Cir. 1949);
Warner Holding Company, v. Creedon, 166 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1948);
Woods v. Blake, 84 F. Supp. 570 (D.C.N.J. 1949); Creedon v. Arielly, 8
F.R.D. 265 (W.D.N.Y. 1948); U.S. v. Cowen's Estate, 91 F. Supp. 331(D.C. Mass. 1950).
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because the remedies provided for in the Act did not contemplate
restitution as a substitute for damages as provided for in sec-
tion 205a.
It might be objected that where the Administrator is en-
titled to sue for statutory damages under section 205e the
Act provides that the whole of the recovery goes to the
United States and that therefore, it would be improper to
divert part of the recovery to tenants in the guise of a res-
titution order under section 205a. But if the result seems
odd, it is still, we think, a logical consequence of the holding
in Porter v. Warner Holding Co. 23
Since the decision in the Porter case the lower federal courts
have consistently pointed to that case as authority for the prop-
osition that restitution may be given under section 205a of the
Emergency Price Control Act.2 4 It is submitted that the validity
of that case as authority in other cases where different remedies
are sought and different sections of the Act are invoked is of
considerable doubt. In the following cases it will be shown that
although the remedies sought were vastly different than those
pressed by the government in the Porter case, the lower federal
courts have followed that case even when the result has been to
restrict the Constitutional right of trial by jury in suits on a
* penal statute.
Thus, in Woods v. Blake2 5 the Administrator brought suit for
an injunction and for treble damages. Both sections 205a and
205e were invoked by the Administrator. The defendant insisted
that the prayer for an injunction under section 205a should not
deprive him of a jury trial on the issue of legal damages under
section 205e. He argued:
There exists a right of trial by jury as a right when the
issue is one of legal damages. The injunctive relief is inci-
dental and the recovery of money damages in the instant
case does not depend in any way on the prior showing of
cause for injunctive relief. 6
This contention was denied by the court and trial by jury was
refused on the theory that once equity had taken jurisdiction
under the injunction section of the Act, it would give full relief
in the form of damages. Since damages were asked for under
23. Cobleigh v. Woods, 172 F.2d 167 (1st Cir. 1949).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. 84 F. Supp. 570 (D.C.N.J. 1949).
26. Woods v. Blake, 84 F. Supp. 570, 571 (D.C.N.J. 1949).
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section 205e, there was no vesitge of a reason for holding that
they were given as incidental to equitable relief. The Porter
case was thus completely distinguishable on this point. But at
least it did resemble that case in one important aspect: injunc-
tive relief was demanded.
Other cases 7 have gone even further in extending the Porter
case beyond its facts. Even when no injunctive delief was de-
manded the courts have allowed damages by way of restitution
without trial by jury. These cases, differing so materially from
the facts and grounds of proceeding adopted in the Porter case
cannot claim it as authority for the broad proposition stated in
Creedon v. Arielly that:
... the Constitutional right to a jury trial is not applicable
to this case. Amendment VII of the Constitution guarantees
the right of trial by jury in Suits at common law. It does
not apply to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. It is
only to rights and remedies as they were generally known
and enforced by jury trial that the Amendment applies.2 8
The statement is pure dictum because the admissions in the case,
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure section 36a, left no
issue of fact remaining for a jury to try. It is apparent that this
language is entirely inconsistent with the principal case of
United States v. Jepson. One must be wrong. It is submitted
that the principal case is more in keeping with the authorities
than is Porter v. Warner Holding Co. and the cases which follow
and extend it to different factual situations. Extending the doc-
trine of incidental legal relief in equity to cases involving the
action of debt on a statute will result in the deprivation of the
right to trial by jury in a well recognized common law action.
The Porter case has not only refused to follow the long line of
authority that debt on a statute is triable by jury, but it encour-
ages a strained construction of economic legislation, the result
of which is to whittle away the right of trial by jury.
ROGER P. ENGLISH
27. U.S. v. Cowen's Estate, 91 F. Supp. 331 (D.C. Mass. 1950); Creedon
v. Randolph, 165 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1948); Woods v. Lajeunesse, 82
F. Supp. 445 (D.C.N.H. 1949); Creedon v. Arielly, 8 F.R.D. 265 (W.D.N.Y.
1948).
28. Creedon v. Arielly, 8 F.R.D. 265, 268 (W.D.N.Y. 1948).
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